

1. What is ersatz modal realism? What are the crucial ways in which it differs from Lewis's view? (with respect to what they say about what is actual, actualized, concrete, contingent...)
2. "It is wrong to say that the ersatz modal realists and I agree at least that possible worlds exist, and disagree only about whether those worlds are abstract or concrete." (p.140) Why does Lewis think this is wrong? Is it? How much of the dispute can be characterized as "a mere issue of terminology".
3. Explain one of the three ersatz views and assess Lewis's objections.
4. What objection is Kripke making with the example of Humphrey in the quoted passage on p. 195? How does Lewis respond?
5. Starting around p. 199, Lewis uses the premise that people and other objects have intrinsic properties such as shape to challenge certain views about an individual's existence with respect to other times and worlds. What are the targets of his argument? How does the argument go? Could there be a reason to treat the temporal and modal cases differently?
6. What is haecceitism? What other claims must it be distinguished from? What is the relation between Lewis' version of modal realism and haecceitism?

MIT OpenCourseWare  
<https://ocw.mit.edu/>

24.401 Proseminar in Philosophy II  
Spring 2020

For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: <https://ocw.mit.edu/terms>.