

Williamson, *Knowledge and Its Limits*

1. Is knowing a state of mind? (Chapter 1.)
2. ‘One motive for internalism is the combination of the idea that genuine states are causally efficacious with the idea that mental states are causally efficacious only if narrow...Much needs to be probed and questioned in these internalist ideas’ (60-1). Please probe and question.
3. ‘The aim of this chapter is to argue that we are cognitively homeless. Although much is in fact accessible to our knowledge, almost nothing is inherently accessible to it. However, it is first necessary to sharpen the issue, to make it more susceptible to argument’ (94). Explain Williamson’s sharpening.
4. Set out and give a preliminary assessment of the anti-luminosity argument for the condition that one feels cold (section 4.3).
5. Does the argument commit some sorites-style fallacy (4.5)?
6. If only trivial conditions are luminous, what is the significance of this result?

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