The 'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning. A word means the thing it stands for. Is this right?

> ⇒ Incomplete — sentences have meanings too.
> > o   Sentences are not just lists of names; they are true/false, lists aren't.
> > o   'Brutus killed Caesar' vs 'Caesar killed Brutus
> ⇒ Incomplete even for words, since not every word is a term; 'or,' 'drink,' 'of,' 'very,' …

Frege: The Fido theory doesn't work even for names!!

Informative Identity: 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is informative, unike'Venus = Venus.'
Empty Names: 'Odysseus tied himself to the mast' is true in fiction, hence not meaningless.
Existence Claims: 'Santa Claus doesn't exist' is true in reality, hence not meaningless.

The meta-linguistic solution. 'The morning star = the evening star' says that 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' stand for the same thing. 'Santa Claus doesn't exist' says 'Santa Claus' doesn't stand for anything.

Frege rejects this too. Identity-statements are not just about words. They express "genuine knowledge."
Likewise existence-claims, etc.

[[Further problems with the meta-linguistic approach.
       (i) where does it stop? ('a is the same size as b')
       (ii) what about mixed uses? ('a and b are both planets, and in fact are identical')
       (iii) what happens with translation? the meaning doesn't change just because the words do.]]

His solution: there is a level of meaning beyond reference.

> Now it is plausible to connect with a sign not only the designated object, which may
> be called the reference of the sign, but also the *sense* of the sign, in which is contained
> the manner and context of presentation. (218)

How does this help? 'The morning star = the evening star' doesn't mean the same as 'Venus = Venus,' because 'the morning star' has a different sense than 'the evening star.'   The statement is informative because information is at the level of sense, not reference.

What are senses? Mode of *presentation*, how the referent is presented. Think of seeing the same road from the bottom versus the top. Mode of *specification*, how the referent is specified or picked out. The sense of 'the morning star' might be *the brightest heavenly body in such and such a region of the morning sky.* Senses as given by descriptions: *the unique thing which is F and G and H and etc.* What senses are not: ideas. Senses are objective and shared; ideas are subjective and private.

Recall the other two problems for the 'Fido'-Fido theory. *Non-referring terms* like 'Santa Claus.' *Negative singular existentials* like 'Santa Claus doesn't exist.'   Does the sense theory help with these?

Sense without reference. Frege gives examples from astronomy and mathematics (p. 218). 'Vulcan' and 'Odysseus' are still meaningful even in the absence of a referent. If we think of senses as modes of presentation, they're meaningful in the way hallucinations are. If we think of them as modes of specification, they're like conditions that nothing satisfies.

A sentence containing an empty name will lack truth-value; it will be neither true nor false. 'Odysseus tied himself to the mast.' But it still expresses a thought—"thought" is his word for the sense of a sentence. It's not like the sentence is nonsense; we know how the world would have to be for the sentence to be true.

('Odysseus tied himself to the mast' is not true given that there is no such person. Does it say that such a

person exists? No, for then it would be false, and it is not false either. It *presupposes* there is such a person (p. 224). A sentence's presuppositions are the conditions that it has to meet to get a truth value at all.)

What account can now be given of negative existentials? 'Odysseus doesn't exist' seems like a truth containing an empty term, which was supposed to be impossible. Perhaps it "really" says that there is nothing Odysseus-like, nothing satisfying the conditions laid down by the word's sense. 'π exists' expresses the thought that a fixed ratio exists between the circumference and diameter of a circle.

Attitude attribution. I used to believe that Superman was strong, while Clark wasn't. These are another problem for the Fido theory. Two problems, actually: (i) co-referential names should be inter-substitutable "salvae veritate," (ii) these names don't actually refer in the first place!

Frege: Words in indirect discourse have as their reference what is standardly their sense. Then we can continue to hold that substitution of co-referring expressions preserves a sentence's truth; it is just that, in indirect discourse, sameness of reference is only given when we would normally have sameness of sense.

Does *every* meaningful chunk of language have both sense and reference? What about sentences? A sentence's sense is the proposition it expresses, or in Frege-speak the "thought" (der Gedanke). What is the reference? An implicit theme is now made explicit. Meaning is compositional (C), which implies substitutivity (S):

(C) The sense/reference of the whole depends on the senses/references of its parts.
(S) Substituting a new part with the same sense/reference preserves the sense/reference of the whole.

The reference of a sentence thus has to be something that holds fixed when the components' referents hold fixed. Here's an argument that that can only be truth-value. Suppose (#) A's truth-value = B's truth-value. From this premise we argue that A and B must co-refer.

1. *A* has the same referent as *A's truth-value = T* (logically equivalent sentences co-refer)
2. *A's truth-value* has the same referent as *B's truth-value* (by (#))
3. *A's truth-value = T* has the same referent as *B's truth-value = T* (from (2), by (S))
4. *B's truth-value = T* has the same referent as *B* (logically equivalent sentences co-refer)
5. *A* has the same referent as *B* (from (1), (3), (4) by transitivity of identity)

"We have realized that we are to look for the reference of a sentence whenever the reference of the sentence-components are the thing that matters; and that is the case whenever and only when we ask for the truth value. Thus we find ourselves persuaded to accept the truth-value of a sentence as its reference." (221)

Surprising implication: if sentences *A* and *B* co-refer (agree in truth-value), S(*A*) agrees in truth-value with S(*B*). This certainly fits some examples. Say *S(P)* is a truth-functional context of the kind encountered in logic, e.g., *It is not the case that P.*

(1) 'It is not the case that A' has the same truth-value as 'It is not the case that B.'

But there would seem to be counterexamples; single underlining is for *A*, double for *B*.

(2) 'June fears <u>she will never see Hesperus again</u>,' 'June fears <u>she will never see Phosphorus again</u>'
(3) 'Columbus inferred from <u>the roundness of the earth</u> that .., '…inferred from <u>the roundness of his plate</u> that …'
(4) 'She is poor, but happy,' 'She is loved, but happy.'
(5) 'After <u>the sun rises</u>, it gets warmer,' 'After <u>the sun sets</u>, it gets warmer.'
(6) 'Because <u>ice is lighter than water</u>, it floats on water,' 'Because <u>ice is cold</u>, it floats on water.'

What can Frege say about these examples?

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