

Expected Utility

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In class we mentioned (without proof) that the expected utility representation is cardinally unique, that is, unique up to positive affine transformations. Now we will go over the simple proof of this important result.¹

A binary relation \succsim on X is *trivial* if $x \sim y$ for all $x, y \in X$. When we regard \succsim as a subset of $X \times X$, the relation \succsim is trivial when it is equal to the entire product $X \times X$. For two functions $U, V : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, We say that V is a *positive affine transformation* of U if there are $\alpha > 0$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $V = \alpha U + \beta$. Clearly if V is a positive affine transformation of U , then U is a positive affine transformation of V .

Theorem 1. *Take a not-trivial \succsim on X . If both linear functions $U, V : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ represent \succsim , then V is a positive affine transformation of U .*

Proof. Assume first that \succsim is trivial. Then U and V are constant, and we can simply choose $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = V - U$. From now on, suppose that \succsim is not trivial, and pick $x, y \in X$ such that $x \succ y$. We divide the proof in three cases, depending on whether $z \in [x, y]$, $z \succ x$ or $y \succ z$. Assume first that $z \in [x, y]$. Since U represents \succsim , we have that $U(z) \in [U(x), U(y)]$. Furthermore, since $U(x) > U(y)$, there is $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ such that

$$U(z) = \lambda U(x) + (1 - \lambda)U(y) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \lambda = \frac{U(z) - U(y)}{U(x) - U(y)}.$$

Since U is linear, $U(z) = U(\lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y)$, and therefore $z \sim \lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y$, because U represents \succsim . However, also V represents \succsim and is linear. Hence

$$V(z) = \lambda V(x) + (1 - \lambda)V(y) \quad \Rightarrow \quad V(z) = \lambda(V(x) - V(y)) + V(y).$$

Using the expression for λ found above:

$$V(z) = \frac{U(z) - U(y)}{U(x) - U(y)}(V(x) - V(y)) + V(y) = \frac{V(x) - V(y)}{U(x) - U(y)}U(z) + \frac{U(x)V(y) - U(y)V(x)}{U(x) - U(y)}.$$

¹I will adopt the same notation used in the previous recitation notes (2/6).

Therefore we set

$$\alpha = \frac{V(x) - V(y)}{U(x) - U(y)} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = \frac{U(x)V(y) - U(y)V(x)}{U(x) - U(y)}.$$

So we have just shown that $V(z) = \alpha U(z) + \beta$ whenever $z \in [x, y]$. Using the same methodology, you can verify that $V(z) = \alpha U(z) + \beta$ also when $z > x$ or $y > z$, completing the proof. \square

Curiosity: A somehow related result is that there are no “proper followers” among expected utility maximizers. Take two preference relations \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 on X . We say that \succsim_2 is a *follower* of \succsim_1 if, for all $x, y \in X$,

$$x \succsim_1 y \quad \Rightarrow \quad x \succsim_2 y.$$

If we regard \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 as subsets of $X \times X$, then \succsim_2 is a follower of \succsim_1 whenever \succsim_1 is a subset of \succsim_2 . Notice that, when \succsim_2 is a follower of \succsim_1 , we must have that, for all $x, y \in X$,

$$x \sim_1 y \quad \Rightarrow \quad x \sim_2 y.$$

However, it may happen that $x \succ_1 y$ and $x \sim_2 y$.

Proposition 1. *Take \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 on X which satisfy A1, A2 and A3. If \succsim_2 is a follower of \succsim_1 , then either \succsim_2 is equal to \succsim_1 or \succsim_2 is trivial.*

Proof. We will show that if \succsim_1 is different from \succsim_2 , then \succsim_2 must be trivial. Assume therefore that \succsim_1 is different from \succsim_2 , that is, there are $x, y \in X$ such that $x \succ_1 y$ but $x \sim_2 y$ (why?). Since both \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 satisfy A1, A2 and A3, by the Mixture Space Theorem we can find linear functions $U_1, U_2 : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ representing \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 , respectively. We will show that $U_2(z) = U_2(y)$ for all $z \in X$, which means that \succsim_2 is trivial. We divide the proof in three cases: $x \succ_1 z \succ_1 y$, $z \succ_1 x$ and $y \succ_1 z$.

Case 1: $x \succ_1 z \succ_1 y$. Since \succsim_2 is a follower of \succsim_1 , then $x \succ_2 z \succ_2 y$. Since $x \sim_2 y$, then by transitivity it must be that $z \sim_2 y$, and therefore $U_2(z) = U_2(y)$.

Case 2: $z \succ_1 x$. Since $U_1(x) \in (U_1(z), U_1(y))$, we can find $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ such that

$$U_1(x) = \alpha U_1(z) + (1 - \alpha)U_1(y).$$

By linearity, $x \sim_1 \alpha z + (1 - \alpha)y$. Since \succsim_2 is a follower of \succsim_1 , it must be the case that $x \sim_2 \alpha z + (1 - \alpha)y$. Therefore by linearity of U_2 :

$$U_2(x) = \alpha U_2(z) + (1 - \alpha)U_2(y) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \alpha U_2(z) = \alpha U_2(y) + (U_2(x) - U_2(y)).$$

Since $U_2(x) = U_2(y)$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, it must be the case that $U_2(z) = U_2(y)$, as wanted.

Case 3: $y \succ_1 z$. Analogous to case 2, and left as exercise. \square

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